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ABSTRACT 
 
Cooperating with individuals whose altruism is not motivated by genuine prosocial 
emotions could have been costly in ancestral division of labour partnerships. How do 
humans ‘know’ whether or not an individual has the prosocial emotions committing 
future cooperation? Frank (1988) has hypothesized two pathways for altruist-detection: 
(a) facial expressions of emotions signalling character; and (b) gossip regarding the target 
individual’s reputation. Detecting non-verbal cues signalling commitment to cooperate 
may be one way to avoid the costs of exploitation. Spontaneous smiles while cooperating 
may be reliable index cues because of the physiological constraints controlling the neural 
pathways mediating involuntary emotional expressions. Specifically, it is hypothesized 
that individuals whose help is mediated by a genuine sympathy will express involuntary 
smiles (which are observably different from posed smiles). To investigate this idea, 38 
participants played dictator games (i.e. a unilateral resource allocation task) against 
cartoon faces with a benevolent emotional expression (i.e. concern furrows and smile). 
The faces were presented with information regarding reputation (e.g. descriptions of an 
altruistic character vs. a non-altruistic character). Half of the sample played against icons 
with symmetrical smiles (representing a spontaneous smile) while the other half played 
against asymmetrically smiling icons (representing a posed smile). Icons described as 
having altruistic motives received more resources than icons described as self-interested 
helpers. Faces with symmetrical smiles received more resources than faces with 
asymmetrical smiles. These results suggest that reputation and smile asymmetry 
influence the likelihood of cooperation and thus may be reliable cues to altruism. These 
cues may allow for altruists to garner more resources in division of labour situations. 
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How can genetic self-promotion design costly organism-level adaptations for 
delivering benefits to others? Simply put, how did altruism between non-kin evolve in 
humans? One adaptive problem for designing psychological adaptations mediating 
altruism is the costs associated with free-rider exploitation in division of labour 
partnerships. Imagine that you engage in a joint venture where you and your partner are 
task specialists reaping the benefits from your division of labour. Benefits are attained 
because neither of you would have been able to succeed at the goal without the other. 
However, if you chose your partner based on some arbitrary criteria (e.g. he or she told 
you “I am honest, you can trust me.”) you could be opening yourself up to exploitation. 
What compounds the costs of exploitation in a division of labour situation is that it is 
difficult to monitor cheating. Indeed in some conditions you may not even recognize 
cheating because you are not specialized in the task being performed. 
One hypothesis for the maintenance of altruism in division of labour situations is that 
altruists encode subtle nonverbal cues signalling willingness to cooperate in the future 
(Frank, 1988). These signals are hypothesized to manipulate the sensory systems of other 
altruists, facilitating the formation of a coalition with the sender. If altruists can detect 
one another and form social support networks, this may allow for the selection of genes 
predisposing altruism. In mathematical simulations and modelling it appears that alliance 
formation among altruists cognitively equipped to detect one another may evolve (Frank, 
1988; Peck, 1995; Wilson & Dugatkin, 1997; Cooper & Wallace, 1998; de Vos, 
Smaniotto, & Elsas, 2001). Surprisingly there is little evidence testing the basic 
assumption that humans can detect altruists (Brown & Moore, 2000). Furthermore even if 
altruists are detectable, how is this accomplished (e.g. what are the nonverbal and 
paralinguistic signals involved, and what are the costs maintaining signal reliability)? 
Despite the theoretical importance of reliable signals indicating altruistic character, to 
date no studies have isolated the signals or even demonstrated costs maintaining signal 
reliability. 
This chapter has two goals. One is to integrate the literature on human altruism 
detection (i.e. Frank, 1988; Wilson & Dugatkin, 1997; Brown & Moore, 2000) with the 
field on animal signalling (Zahavi, 1987; Grafen, 1990; Adams & Mesterton-Gibbons, 
1995; Guilford & Dawkins, 1995; Maynard Smith & Harper, 1988; 1995; Maynard 
Smith, 1991; Vehrencamp, 2000). The second goal is to report an experimental 
investigation of two potential signals of altruism (i.e. nonverbal and reputation cues). 
Both nonverbal and reputation cues to altruism have been hypothesized to maintain 
human cooperation via indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Hirshleifer, 1987; Frank, 
1988) and multilevel selection processes (Wilson & Dugatkin, 1997). However, there is 
little experimental evidence supporting the hypothesis that reputation cues (e.g. being 
known as having sincere motives for helping others) and/or nonverbal expression of 
prosocial emotions lead to any tangible benefits. Section II of this chapter presents 
findings consistent with the hypothesis that nonverbal and reputation cues accrue tangible 
benefits in evolutionary games. 
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I. RELIABLE SIGNALLING THEORY AND HUMAN 
ALTRUIST-DETECTION 
 
Prosocial emotion scrutiny would do well evolutionarily as altruism that is performed 
without a sympathetic basis would be less likely to occur again in the future when it is 
not in the self-interest of the individual (Trivers, 1971). That is, when help is motivated 
by self-interest (e.g. conscious concerns of reciprocity) the donor may not perform future 
acts of altruism when they are not being watched. Indeed, if prosocial emotions compel 
altruists to cooperate it is possible that self-interested emotions also compel individuals to 
cooperate only when it obviously benefits the donor. One problem of coordinating 
cooperating partnerships is determining the likelihood that a potential partner will 
cooperate in the future and do so even when not being monitored. Hirshleifer (1987) and 
Frank (1987) have provided detailed models extending Trivers’ (1971) speculations on 
reliable indicators of future altruism. Specifically, the prosocial emotions are viewed as 
guarantees or commitment devices of future altruistic behaviour. The key to Frank’s 
(1988) and Hirshleifer’s (1987) models is that the emotions, which guarantee cooperative 
moves, can be reliably discerned (Zahavi, 1987; Grafen, 1990). How can perceivers 
reliably discern prosocial emotions? Ekman (1985) has reviewed the literature on 
nonverbal communication and suggests that body language, pitch and timbre of the voice, 
and facial expression can be reliable indicators of underlying affective states. Since the 
linkages from emotional states to the expression of these states are under involuntary 
control, perceivers may be exposed to reliable signals. Specifically, for mimics the costs 
of putting involuntary neural pathways and facial muscles under conscious control may 
be too costly (in terms of practice and/or re-configuring the physiology involved in the 
putative signals). 
Nonverbal signals of prosociality are only reliable indicators of underlying altruistic 
intent when there are sender and/or receiver-imposed costs (Frank, 1988; Adams & 
Mesterton-Gibbons, 1995; Guilford & Dawkins, 1995; Brown & Moore, 2000). For 
example, when signals are cheap to fake mimics should proliferate and drive a population 
of honest signallers towards extinction. However, when mimics are unable to fake the 
signal, honest signallers can continue to transmit accurate information. Therefore if 
altruism is signalled nonverbally in humans, there must be some mechanism maintaining 
signal reliability. Indeed, selfish and/or deceptive mutants are a general problem for 
evolutionary models of cooperation and signalling (Michod & Roze, 2001). 
 
 
Index and Conventional Cues to Human Altruism 
 
A reliable signal is a cue that honestly reveals an aspect of the sender to one or more 
receivers. Why should animals (including humans) ever reveal anything about 
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themselves? There appears to be a number of conditions in which reliable signals can 
evolve when there are sender and receiver-imposed costs (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Types of signals, costs, design and applications to human altruism 
(modified from Vehrencamp, 2000). 
 
Signal Type Costs Signal Design Application to Human Altruism 
Index Physiological / 
physical constraints
Signal design linked 
to sender attributes 
Neural mechanisms 
controlling involuntary 
expression of prosocial 
emotions (e.g. smiling).  
Quality 
Handicap 
Signal production Signal intensity 
linked to sender 
quality 
Social status and/or 
capacity to cooperate. 
General 
Handicap 
Signal production Signal intensity 
linked to sender 
need 
How much one needs 
assistance from others. 
Vulnerability 
Handicap 
Vulnerability to 
receiver attack 
Signal places sender 
at risk of receiver 
attack 
Signalling willingness to 
cooperate may attract 
exploiters. 
Conventional Receiver retaliation Arbitrary form Punishment of deceptive 
signalers allows for signal 
reliability.  
 
As seen in Table 1, the primary literature on animal signalling focuses on five ways 
in which reliable signals are costly (Vehrencamp, 2000). These types of reliable signals 
can be divided into those signals that impose a cost on the sender (e.g. signal production 
costs like bright, parasite free, tail feathers) and signals that impose costs due to the 
receiver’s behaviour in response to the signal (Adams & Mesterton-Gibbons, 1995; 
Guilford & Dawkins, 1995). Specifically, the signal may have costs inflicted upon the 
sender by the receiver (i.e. receiver-dependent costs) or imposed by the sender’s signal 
itself (i.e. sender-dependent costs). Either way the signal will be reliable as long as there 
are costs preventing deceit. There may be two distinct types of sender-dependent costs: 
(a) physiological constraints preventing mimicry (i.e. “index signals”); and (b) signal 
production costs (signal is a costly handicap for survival). There are two sub-types of 
handicaps with sender-dependent costs. One is when signal production correlates with 
sender genetic quality (e.g. Peacock’s tail) and the other is when signal production is 
correlated with sender’s need for assistance (e.g. hunger or thirst). Examples of two 
distinct types of receiver-dependent costs are: (a) signal increases likelihood of receiver 
attacking the sender; and (b) receivers punish mimics. Table 1 also highlights the ways in 
which theoretical findings on animal signalling may inform evolutionary psychologists 
interested in signals of altruism. In the fourth column of Table 1 the application to human 
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altruism is briefly described. For example, the neural mechanisms controlling involuntary 
facial expressions of prosocial emotions (e.g. concern and interest for others) may qualify 
as a reliable index signal (this will be discussed in more detail in the section entitled 
“Index Cues to Human Altruism”). With the index signal there are no costs to signal 
production, only to signal mimicry. Quality handicaps may be connected to human 
altruism signalling. Analogous to the peacock’s tail, individuals who have high social 
status may bestow altruism upon others (Zahavi, 1987). This could increase the donor’s 
status and/or mating opportunities (Boone, 1998). General handicaps may assist signal 
reliability in human cooperative ventures. Specifically, signals of need may reflect the 
degree to which donors require assistance. The Sir Philip Sidney game has been used to 
model how signals of need are evolutionarily stable (Maynard Smith, 1991). Regardless 
of the importance of reliable signals of need in evolutionary games, the reliability of 
signals of altruism may be an orthogonal issue. Vulnerability handicaps may have more 
relevance for altruism signals in humans. Individuals that signal altruistic intentions may 
be revealing to exploiters that they are ideal ‘suckers’ in division of labour partnerships. 
Only individuals capable of buffering the costs of exploitation may bother signalling 
cooperative intentions. One example of a buffering capacity may be if the altruist has a 
large kin/and or non-kin group capable of retaliating on the donor’s behalf. The final 
signal type in Table 1 is the conventional signal. In the case of human altruism any signal 
(e.g. verbal promises) could potentially become associated with likelihood to be altruistic. 
If mimics adopt the signal there may be high receiver retaliation costs (e.g. punishment) 
for not following through with the promise of cooperation. 
Of course prosocial emotion signalling may potentially fall into any of the five signal 
types - see Table 1. This chapter investigates the possibility of physiologically 
constrained index signals and conventional signals of altruism. The reason for this focus 
is that there is evidence in the field of cognitive neuroscience that spontaneous (i.e. 
‘heartfelt’) emotional expressions are physiologically constrained via dedicated neural 
pathways (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 1998). The second type of reliable signal focused 
upon in this chapter is the conventional signal. A conventional signal in the case of 
human altruism signalling would be when deceptive signallers lie that they are altruistic 
(e.g. via language). In this case deceptive information may be heavily punished by 
perceivers when the convention is violated (i.e. not lying about your willingness to 
engage in unselfishly motivated acts of altruism). 
 
 
Index Cues to Human Altruism 
 
For a cue to altruism to qualify as an index the signal would have to be 
physiologically constrained (Maynard Smith & Harper, 1988; 1995; Maynard Smith, 
1991; Vehrencamp, 2000). Physiologically constrained cues prevent signal mimicry. For 
example, some forms of nonverbal display could qualify as index signals if they were 
reliably linked to likelihood of future altruism. Although it should be reminded that no 
nonverbal configuration of signals has been shown to be reliably linked to human 
altruism. One possibility for an altruism / facial expression link is the human smile. 
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In humans, the smile is under the control of two neural pathways (Meihlke, 1973; 
Myers, 1976; Ekman, Hage & Friesen, 1981; Wylie & Goodale, 1988; Gazanniga & 
Smylie, 1990; Smith, Smith, & Ellgring, 1996; Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 1998). One 
pathway mediates spontaneous smiling expressions and may be implicated in unfakeable 
prosocial signals. Due to neuro-architectural constraints on spontaneous smiles (e.g. see 
Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1990) an individual’s self-interested tendencies may be detected 
before they cheat. For example when conditions require a target to perform (or return) a 
favour their facial expressions will be scrutinized. If a cooperator produces ‘half-hearted’ 
facial expressions (e.g. a phoney smile) in the context of helping others, the receivers of 
these cues may conclude that the target lacks the prosocial motivation to help. 
Alternatively, when genuine altruists are required to perform (or return) a favour their 
facial expressions should appear more genuine and interested in helping. A good example 
of a facial expression constrained by neural pathways is ‘genuine’ and ‘false’ smile 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1990). When helping, prosocial targets 
should smile more genuinely than antisocial targets. 
However, due to the payoffs for deceptive signals, perfect altruist-detection may not 
be expected unless the costs of scrutiny are amply repaid (e.g. via the formation of 
altruist-altruist partnerships). Specifically, when the costs of exploitation are high and the 
probability of interacting with an exploiter is high, computational energy requirements 
for detection should be paid to receive the benefits of trustworthy division of labour 
partnerships. In the following paragraphs a hypothesized frequency-dependent arms race 
between deception and deception-detection is elucidated. 
Perfectly distinguishable signals of altruism suffer from a fatal conceptual flaw as 
pointed out by Frank (1988). Imagine a population where the signal for altruism was an 
easily recognizable “A” on the sender’s forehead. Over evolutionary time cooperators 
will assortate leaving defectors to interact with one another. The frequency of defectors 
should gradually disappear from the population. In this type of ecology there would be 
large fitness benefits to signal mimicry. If physiological mimicry were possible natural 
selection would favour it and altruists would begin to interact randomly. From the point 
of view of altruists the costs of random interaction depends upon the frequency of 
defectors in the population (which would be increasing due to added benefits of 
exploiting others cooperative efforts). 
Since the benefits of deception are great when deceivers are at low frequency (Frank, 
1988), it is expected that natural selection may favour re-configuring neural pathways to 
avoid detection. Counter adaptations to avoid deception-detection may select for once 
spontaneous expressions to come under voluntary control. Therefore altruism signals lose 
reliability. All other things being equal, once prosocial signals fail to maintain reliability, 
altruists (or signalling intentions) should decrease in frequency. When deceivers are able 
to mimic prosocial signals (e.g. via mutation) they should increase in frequency in a 
population, which in turn may select for receivers who will punish or avoid misleading 
signals. It should be pointed out that signalling and mimicry of altruistic emotions may 
resemble a predator-prey arms race. 
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Figure 1. A frequency-dependent polymorphism whereby mimics and altruists are 
fluctuating around equilibrium point over evolutionary time. 
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As seen in Figure 1 when the frequency of altruists is high there will be a niche for 
deceptive communication. This is due to altruists not bothering to pay the costs of 
scrutiny (e.g. time and effort to decode signal – see Frank, 1988) when the probability of 
interacting with another altruist is high. Once mimics master the signal, altruists will 
begin to decrease in the population (relative to mimics). However, mimics do not have a 
monopoly on evolving effective counter-adaptations. As soon as the signal becomes 
meaningless altruists could begin discriminating intentions based on some other cue – 
thus increasing in frequency via assortative interactions once again. Frank’s (1988) model 
predicts that there have been frequency-dependent oscillations between signal detection 
and signal deception over evolutionary time. Trivers’ (1985) also has an interesting 
discussion of this hypothesized arms race between deception and deception-detection. 
 
 
Conventional Cues to Human Altruism 
 
Another pathway for the formation of altruist-altruist partnerships is basing 
assessments on conventional signals of altruistic reputation. Reputations for honesty are 
important in humans cross-culturally (Brown, 1991). Alexander (1988) pointed to the 
benefit of indirect reciprocity whereby individuals cultivate a reputation for altruism 
among third party reciprocators. For example helping the sick or elderly who cannot 
reciprocate could facilitate third party altruism directed towards the donor. In order for an 
altruistic reputation to be a conventional signal there must be punishment of individuals 
who foster an altruistic reputation as they subtly cheat others. Cooperating for the 
preview of others may not be sufficient to cultivate an altruistic reputation. Rather 
helping others with an emotional regard for the recipient’s interest may be a crucial 
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criterion for receivers to deliver third party benefits in human societies (Brown & Moore, 
2000). Frank’s (1988) model of human altruism assumes that there are costs to signal 
scrutiny and they may not be paid unless the probability of interacting with a cheater in 
division of labour situations is high. It is reasonable to predict that there are cues to 
altruism and that in evolutionary environments these cues would be heavily scrutinized in 
order to make reliable partner selections due to the costs of exploitation. In the next 
section smile asymmetries and reputation are empirically explored. 
 
 
II. INVESTIGATION OF SMILE ASYMMETRY AND 
REPUTATION CUES 
 
There have been few studies on what aspects of facial expression may cue others to 
an individual’s level of altruism. Based on theoretical work discussed in the first part of 
this chapter it would be expected that smile asymmetries and reputation might be reliable 
cues to underling altruistic intent. 
 
 
Smiling - A Reliable Index Cue to Altruism? 
 
Neuroscience has investigated the physiological constraints on the human smile 
(Meihlke, 1973; Myers, 1976; Ekman, Hage & Friesen, 1981; Wylie & Goodale, 1988; 
Gazanniga & Smylie, 1990; Smith, Smith, & Ellgring, 1996; Gazzaniga, Ivry, & 
Mangun, 1998). Most of this work does not explicitly have an evolutionary point of view 
and has never considered the possibility that the smile may reliably signal aspects of 
character or intentions. 
As discussed in Section I humans have two neural systems for controlling smiles: one 
under involuntary control and the other under voluntary control (Gazanniga & Smylie, 
1990; Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 1998). The left hemisphere of the brain has been 
found to control voluntary smiles (Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1990). The left-side of the brain 
sends messages to the contralateral VII nucleus which then innervates the facial muscles 
on the right side of the face (Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1990). Simultaneously, the left 
hemisphere also sends information across the corpus callosum to the right hemisphere, 
which functions to innervate the facial muscles on the left-side of the face. This only 
occurs during posed, voluntary smiles. Wylie and Goodale (1988) have shown that posed 
smiles are asymmetrical (i.e. the right-side is higher than the left-side of the mouth). 
For spontaneous or involuntary smiles a different neural pathway is involved. In 
contrast to posed smiles (which are only triggered by the left hemisphere) spontaneous 
smiles can be triggered by both hemispheres. When an individual experiences a 
spontaneous emotion, a signal travels directly through the midbrain to the brainstem 
nuclei, bypassing the cortex (Gazzaniga et al., 1998). Both hemispheres send signals 
directly down through the midbrain to the brainstem nuclei. 
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Further evidence for two neural pathways in smiling comes from lesion studies. 
Specific lesions in the pyramidal system can impair an individual’s ability to smile on 
request, but the same person can smile normally if amused (Meihlke, 1973; Myers, 
1976). The reverse is true for other neurological disorders, such as Parkinson’s disease. In 
Parkinson’s disease the patient cannot spontaneously smile when happy but can produce 
a posed smile upon request (Smith, Smith, & Ellgring, 1996). 
When humans experience pleasure they spontaneously smile and the left side of the 
smile shows more displacement than the right side (Wylie & Goodale, 1988). Wylie and 
Goodale (1988), in a controlled study measuring smile asymmetries found that during a 
spontaneous smile, the left-side of the mouth is more displaced than in a posed smile. 
Strobe cameras and computer analysis of reference points on the corners of the mouth 
revealed that the left side of the mouth moved more in spontaneous than posed smiles in 
the same targets. This indicates that the right hemisphere is more involved in spontaneous 
emotional expression as compared to the left hemisphere. Not surprisingly humans 
scrutinize the left side of the face more than the right side when assessing facial 
expressions (Burt & Perret, 1997). 
Since there are different neural pathways and observable differences between 
spontaneous and posed smiling behaviour in humans it is possible that perceivers will 
scrutinize smile asymmetries in cooperative situations to make assessments regarding 
genuine concern for others. 
 
 
Adaptive Benefits to the Human Smile? 
 
Is there evidence that the human smile is a signal of trust or altruism? Research 
suggests that humans trust smiling individuals more than non-smiling individuals (Otta, 
Lira, Delevati, Cesar & Pires, 1994; Lafrance & Hecht, 1995). Specifically smiling 
newscasters can influence political candidate choice (Mullen et al., 1986). Interestingly in 
50 randomly collected photographs of George W. Bush and Al Gore taken during the 
USA’s 2000 Presidential race, Bush produced significantly more genuine smiles (Brown 
& Moore, unpublished data). According to a Gallup poll (www.gallup.com) before 
Election Day, Bush was rated as more sincere and trustworthy than Al Gore. Recent 
experimental work shows that photographs of smiling individuals are trusted more than 
non-smiling individuals (Schalemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson, In Press). The human 
smile is expressed in social situations and could be viewed as a revealer of underlying 
intentions. For example, if an individual is smiling while helping others, perceivers may 
assume that the smiling person is in fact genuinely motivated to help. However, natural 
selection should discourage simply assuming that a smiling individual is trustworthy. 
Specifically, a con artist could easily put on a false smile while helping and trick 
perceivers into trusting him or her. Perhaps natural selection has favoured skeptical 
perceivers who scrutinize smiles according to asymmetry. This would only be the case if 
smile asymmetries were reliable indicators of underlying emotional states. 
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Reputation Cues 
 
In order for an altruistic reputation to function as a conventional signal there must be 
some way to penalize deception. Two possible costs to the development of an altruistic 
reputation are: (a) The time and effort required performing unreciprocated altruistic acts 
for the preview of others; and (b) Punishment for the deceptive boasting of how altruistic 
one is when in fact they are not altruistic. One would expect information regarding an 
altruistic character to influence resource allocations. Previous empirical findings (i.e. 
Brown & Moore, 2000) using a different research paradigm (i.e. the Wason selection 
task) found that subjects could detect genuine altruism. It appears that information-
processing mechanisms for altruist-detection are designed in such a way to scrutinize the 
underlying motivations for helping (i.e. self-interested vs. other-interested helping). 
Detecting motivations for helping may sometimes occur through word of mouth or 
gossip (Alexander, 1987; Frank, 1988). Individuals between and within social groups 
may exchange information regarding an individual’s motives for helping in the past. 
Forming a consensus about a person’s ability to be trusted may be beneficial and be 
involved in indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). Repeated 
altruistic acts mediated by a concern for the recipient contribute to an altruistic reputation 
being bestowed upon the altruist by others. When character assessments by multiple 
individuals (with unique perspectives and/or sensory capacities) are involved in 
formation of an altruistic reputation, then reputation may help decrease the costs 
associated with individual scrutiny. Essentially, such a system of altruist-detection would 
be analogous to mate-choice copying in sexual selection models. That is, if everyone 
trusts individual ‘x’ then it may pay to befriend that individual since they are likely 
altruistic. However, this system could be vulnerable to cheats due to an initially poor 
assessment that is subsequently copied by others indiscriminately. As well some 
individuals may not pay the costs associated with detection and reap the benefits of 
other’s scrutiny. Therefore, facial expressions may still be the most reliable way to assess 
an altruistic character. 
 
 
Current Study 
 
To explore the idea that humans assess smiles and reputation in cooperative contexts, 
these properties were varied in an experiment in which participants played resource 
allocation games. Icons exhibiting different types of smiles (asymmetrical smile vs. 
symmetrical smile) were presented to participants along with information regarding the 
intentions of icons (e.g. selfish vs. altruistic). Cartoon icons representing particular 
stylized emotions have been used in numerous psychology experiments (Hansen & 
Hansen, 1988; Hoptman & Levy, 1988; Yeo et al., 1997). Icons are an effective way to 
control for extraneous features of the human face that are unrelated to the emotion under 
investigation. In order to stylistically represent the emotion of prosocial concern two 
aspects of the cartoon face (i.e. eyebrow concern furrows and smiles) were selected due 
the evidence suggesting that these expressions are cross-cultural signals of affiliation 
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(Grant, 1969; Tidd & Lockard, 1978; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989). The symmetrically smiling 
icon was used to represent a genuine, involuntary smile. An asymmetrically smiling icon 
(see Figure 2) was used to represent a posed, voluntary smile. 
The dictator game was selected as a measure of subjects’ resource allocations 
because it is widely used in experimental economics as a test of cooperative tendencies in 
humans (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Bolton, Katok, & Zwick, 1998; Andreoni & 
Vesterlund, 2001). The dictator game is an unilateral resource allocation game that 
requires subjects to divide a valued resource between themselves and an opponent (Eckel 
& Grossman, 1996). In dictator games the experimenter asks subjects to divide up a 
resource (e.g. money) between themselves and another individual. It was predicted that 
participants would deliver fewer resources in dictator games to selfishly motivated icons 
and icons with asymmetrical smiles. 
 
METHODS 
 
Participants: 
 
Thirty-eight (female n = 22; male n = 16) Introductory Psychology students (mean 
age = 20.08; SD = 4.10) participated for 1% credit toward class grade. 
 
 
Procedure: 
 
After signing consent forms, participants played one-shot dictator games for a valued 
resource against cartoon icons. The valued resources in this experiment were lottery 
tickets for a cash draw (total value of prizes = $120). Specifically subjects divided 20 
tickets between themselves and a cartoon icon. In addition, subjects were asked to predict 
how many tickets they believed the icon would give them. Each participant played 
against two icons; one described as a self-interested cooperator and one described as an 
altruistic cooperator. Finally, half of the sample (n = 19) played against symmetrically 
smiling icons and the other half (n = 19) played asymmetrically smiling icons. 
Participants were naive with respect to this between-subjects manipulation. 
 
 
Manipulation of Smile Asymmetry: 
 
Smile symmetry was manipulated only on the left-side of the face in accordance with 
the neuropsychological literature that suggests this is one difference between posed and 
spontaneous smiles (Meihlke, 1973; Myers, 1976; Ekman, Hage & Friesen, 1981; Wylie 
& Goodale, 1988; Gazanniga & Smylie, 1990; Smith, Smith, & Ellgring, 1996; 
Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 1998). Figure 2 depicts an example of the cartoon icons 
used in Study Two (symmetrical smile vs. asymmetrical smile). The asymmetrical smile 
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represents the posed false smile, while the symmetrical smile is designed to represent a 
genuine felt smile. 
 
Figure 2. Benevolent icons with symmetrical and asymmetrical versions 
of the smile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manipulation of altruistic reputation: Each icon had either a reputation for altruism or 
self-interest. The descriptions were taken from Brown and Moore’s (2000) altruist-
detection Wason task. Their altruist-detection tasks were based on Trivers’ (1971) 
hypothesis that natural selection should have designed perceiver psychological 
mechanisms to scrutinize whether motives of generosity accompany the altruistic act, 
since such forms of altruism would be more likely to occur in the future. Therefore the 
altruistic motive for the helping condition stated, “Gave blood and refused cash reward” 
while the self-interested motives for helping condition stated, “Gave blood and demanded 
cash reward.” 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
Reciprocity Based Decision-Making 
 
As expected, the number of tickets players thought they would receive was 
significantly and positively correlated with the number of tickets they gave to the icons: 
 70
Smile Asymmetries and Reputation 71
[R = .67, F (1, 36) = 29.63, p = .001]. This is what would be expected if the decision rules 
mediating human cooperation were based upon reciprocity. 
 
 
Assessments: Smile Asymmetry and Reputation Effects 
 
The number of tickets perceivers predicted icons would allocate was analyzed using 
an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with smile symmetry (asymmetrical smile vs. 
symmetrical smile) as a between-subjects factor and reputation (altruistic vs. self-
interested) as a within-subjects factor. Players predicted that symmetrically smiling icons 
would give more tickets (M = 10.80 / SD = 3.60) than asymmetrically smiling icons (M = 
8.00 / SD = 3.60): F (1,36) = 5.05, p < .05. In addition players predicted that icons 
described as altruistic in the past would give more tickets (M = 13.60 / SD = 6.40) than 
icons described only as self-interested helpers (M = 5.60 / SD = 4.40): F (1,36) = 19.30, p 
< .001. The interaction was not significant. 
 
 
Resource Allocations: Smile Asymmetry and Reputation Effects 
 
Number of tickets allocated was analyzed using an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with smile symmetry (asymmetrical smile vs. symmetrical smile) as a between-subjects 
factor and reputation (altruistic vs. self-interested) as a within-subjects factor. 
Symmetrically smiling icons received 9.60 tickets (SD = 4.40) while asymmetrically 
smiling icons received 6.80 tickets (SD = 2.48). This mean difference was significant: F 
(1,36) = 5.05, p < .05. In addition icons with altruistic reputations received more tickets 
(M = 10.00 / SD = 5.20) compared to icons with reputations for self-interested pseudo-
altruism (M = 6.00 / SD = 4.00): F (1,34) = 39.60, p < .001. The interaction was not 
significant. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Consistent with predictions, smile symmetry and a reputation for altruistically 
motivated helping influenced game players’ assessments of icons and resource 
allocations to icons. Specifically, icons that possessed symmetrical smiles received more 
resources compared to icons with asymmetrical smiles. An altruistic reputation 
influenced subjects’ resource allocations. That is, icons with altruistic motives received 
more resources than icons described as self-interested helpers. Results suggest that smile 
asymmetry and reputation are scrutinized when deciding how to allocate resources. 
Consistent with reciprocal altruism theory (Trivers, 1971) game players were reciprocally 
minded. Based on reputation and facial expressions, game players anticipated cooperative 
moves prospectively and engaged in ‘reciprocity’ (i.e. game players gave more lottery 
tickets to icons they believed would give more lottery tickets to them). 
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Reputation Signals 
 
Icons with information suggesting they were benevolent helpers in the past received 
more resources than icons described as being self-interested helpers. This result is 
consistent with the idea that a reputation for other-interested helping may be beneficial in 
evolutionary games. An altruistic reputation accounted for a substantial proportion of the 
variance in resource allocations (35 percent of the variance). Indeed this is more than 
smile asymmetry’s influence upon resource allocations (14 percent of the variance). 
However, it should be pointed out that the smile asymmetry manipulation was 
implemented using a between-subjects rather than within-subjects design. Removing 
variance due to differences between subjects from the error variance greatly increases the 
power of within-subjects significance tests. Therefore, within-subjects designs are almost 
always more powerful than between-subject designs. Also, there may have been demand 
characteristics in the within-subjects manipulation of reputation increasing the putative 
effect size. Specifically, all subjects received icons with a description of an altruistic and 
selfish cooperator. Thus participants may have ‘realized’ what the experimenter was 
hypothesizing. Nevertheless, it appears that an altruistic reputation influences subjects’ 
resource allocations. If this result holds up in more naturalistic conditions then one may 
assume that it would pay for altruists to cultivate a prosocial image. 
Evolutionarily it is interesting to ask how difficult is for a con artist to cultivate a 
reputation for honesty. Con artists’ evolutionary success at manipulating others may 
depend upon gossip. That is, the con must keep ahead of social transmission (Dugatkin, 
1992). The critical factor appears to be the speed with which a con can infiltrate a group 
before his or her reputation. Research is needed to measure the speed of between-group 
information exchange relative to the speed of which a con artist can garner the interests 
of strangers between groups. It would be predicted that the relative difference should 
correlate with the frequency of con artists in a population. 
 
 
Smiles as Index Signals 
 
Previous research suggests that smiling individuals are trusted and receive more 
resources compared to non-smiling individuals (Tidd & Lockard, 1978; Otto et al., 1994; 
LaFrance & Hecht, 1995; Scharlemann et al., In Press). Cross-cultural ethological 
research by Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989) suggests that smiles are affiliative signals. If others 
scrutinize smiles in order to assess trustworthiness it is expected that altruists would 
exhibit a left-biased smile asymmetry in social encounters. 
Deception may have been a powerful selective force on early hominid cognition 
(Trivers, 1985; Trivers, 2000). Indeed if a particular pattern of smiling while helping 
others is believed by others to be signal of altruism one may expect natural selection to 
favour deceivers that could manifest the signal. Selection would most likely not favour 
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deceivers who practiced putting involuntary neural machinery and facial musculature 
under conscious control, since there may be high costs for being caught. However, a 
reversal in cerebral lateralization could accomplish a similar end product without the 
time, effort and risks associated with practice. If over the course of hominid evolution 
there was a mutation reversing hemispheric involvement in posed smiles, deceivers could 
prosper. For example, left-handers manifest posed smiles that have the characteristic left-
sided oral asymmetry characteristic of a right-handers genuine or spontaneous smile 
(Wylie & Goodale, 1988). Deceivers may benefit from left-handedness since their posed 
smiles when helping could be misperceived as trustworthy. If this were true it would be 
expected that exploitative individuals would be more likely to be left-handed than right-
handed since perceivers would have a difficult time detecting self-interest from the smile. 
In fact, criminal behaviour appears to vary with handedness. Specifically, more left-
handers than right-handers have been involved in criminal acts (Coren, 1998). 
Interestingly in another study left-handers report themselves as being more manipulative 
and Machiavellian (Coren, 1994). Finally, there appears to be a correlation between 
psychopathy and handedness (Hare & Forth, 1985). Further research needs to explore the 
connection between cerebral asymmetries, facial expression and deception. 
Finally, it should be noted that there are numerous candidates for reliable signals 
associated with altruism in human facial expression besides smile asymmetries. For 
example the orbicularis oculi (i.e. periocular muscle region) and the zygomaticus major 
or cheek muscle regions (Ekman & Freisen, 1982; Surakka & Hietanen, 1998) are also 
involved in the involuntary expression of emotions. Evolutionarily one may expect that if 
a deceiver entered the population with a genuine-looking phony smile, perceivers may be 
selected to scrutinize the eye region to make more reliable judgments regarding 
intentions. Viewing facial expression as a step-wise co-evolutionary arms race between 
signalers and perceivers may be a fruitful way to formulate hypotheses. Selection may 
adjust one region of facial expression in favour of deception, but this will create counter-
selection pressures for perceivers to assess another uncorrelated region to ensure reliable 
detection. 
In Dugatkin’s (1992) model of the evolution of the con artist, deceivers prosper when 
they move from community to community faster than cultural transmission (i.e. gossip). 
Signaling trustworthiness nonverbally can benefit the con temporarily but eventually 
gossip may travel faster than they are able to migrate. Perhaps the best strategy for a 
Machiavellian con artist is to move from patch to patch quickly before cultural 
transmission can catch up to them. Cultural transmission of information regarding trust 
could travel particularly fast considering that humans appear to pay special attention to 
the motives underlying altruism (Brown & Moore, 2000). According to Alexander (1987) 
and Nowak and Sigmund (1998) humans assess the altruistic behaviour performed for the 
benefit of a third party. If the third party observer returns the benefits, cooperation could 
have evolved via indirect return payment. This is known as indirect reciprocity 
(Alexander, 1987). If perceivers assess nonverbal signals of prosocial emotions and rely 
on gossip between- and within-groups, exploiters could be at a disadvantage. Con artists 
most likely have evolved counter-strategies to avoid detection. Costs of scrutiny and 
frequency-dependent selection may be one route for the evolutionary maintenance of 
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deception (Frank, 1988). Perceivers may not bother scrutinizing intentions (which takes a 
lot of time and effort) when the frequency of altruists is high in population. Under these 
conditions con artists may prosper. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
Since resource allocations by game players were influenced by smile asymmetry it 
may be that the smile is a reliable index cue to altruistic intentions. This result should be 
viewed as preliminary. For instance the smile symmetry findings were based on cartoon 
icons that are not ecologically valid faces. Humans evolved to assess actual human faces, 
three dimensionally and in real time. In addition, perhaps any facial asymmetry (e.g. in 
the eyes, nostrils etc.) would elicit fewer resources allocated. Future research needs to use 
photographic quality stimuli with several facial features morphed asymmetrically to 
ensure that smile asymmetry per se is a cue to underlying self-interested intentions. 
Despite the limitations to the current study it is encouraging that in an ethological 
investigation of altruists and non-altruists playing a cooperative game, altruists appear to 
produce the left-sided bias when smiling (Brown, 1998). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Several evolutionary models have suggested that social network formation may be a 
pathway to the evolution and stability of cooperation (Frank, 1988; Peck, 1995; Wilson & 
Dugatkin, 1997). The research here suggests that humans assess altruism and 
preferentially deliver resources to altruists. Indeed, these assessments of altruism may be 
involved with the formation of social support networks. This is what an evolutionary 
approach would predict considering the ancestral fitness costs associated with 
unreciprocated altruism. 
Honest signals with a reliable emotional basis may be needed to guarantee perceivers 
that the target is not a con artist. The burgeoning literature on animal signalling (for 
review see Espmark, Amundsen & Rosenqvist, 2000) may help clarify the evolutionary 
maintenance of altruism signals in humans by exploring the costs associated with 
encoding. This chapter has focused mostly on sender-dependent encoding costs (i.e. 
index signals), however there are multiple pathways to signal reliability that do not 
depend on sender-dependent costs (e.g. receivers may exploit or punish signalers – see 
Vehrencamp, 2000). If an altruistic character is detectable, then encoding costs and the 
sensory systems involved in decoding need more empirical elucidation. 
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